Hubert Falco's conviction: "A democratic prison sentence"
"This judgment is exemplary", reacts Alain-David Pothet, a few minutes later the deliberations of the "fridge affair". According to the Var lawyer of the Anticor association, " the court gave a particularly strong signal " while " several elected officials in the region are implicated in probity cases.
A co-owner unhappy with a decision voted on at a general meeting has the right to challenge it before a judge, but this right expires quickly: after two months, the action is, with few exceptions, definitively closed.
The status of co-ownership, established by Law No. 65-557 of 10 July 1965, strictly governs these challenges. Article 42, paragraph 2, stipulates that any legal action seeking to contest decisions made at general meetings must, on pain of forfeiture, be initiated by dissenting or absent co-owners within two months of notification of the meeting minutes. This notification is the responsibility of the managing agent, who must carry it out within one month of the meeting being held. Only co-owners who voted against the decision (dissenting) or were absent and unrepresented (absent) can take action; those who voted in favour or abstained are barred from this recourse.
It should be stressed that this period is not a statute of limitations but a period of preclusion. The distinction is not theoretical: upon its expiry, the decision becomes incontestable, regardless of the seriousness of the alleged procedural or substantive irregularity. The starting point of the period deserves particular attention. According to consistent case law from the Court of Cassation, when notification is made by registered letter, the period runs from the day after the first presentation of the item, regardless of whether the co-owner actually collected it from the post office. The recipient who neglects to collect their mail therefore gains no additional time.
An important exception tempers this strictness. The notification of the minutes must reproduce the text of Article 42, paragraph 2. In the absence of this mention, the notification is irregular and does not open the two-month period: the co-owner can then act within the general limitation period, i.e. five years. Furthermore, an application for legal aid filed after the meeting has been held may interrupt the running of the period.
In practice, a co-owner wishing to challenge a resolution must act without delay. They need to keep the envelope and the acknowledgement of receipt, note the date of the first presentation, and verify that the notification correctly reproduces the mention of Article 42. The managing agent, for their part, has every interest in ensuring the formal regularity of their notifications, failing which they expose the co-ownership to a challenge long after the meeting.
Given the short deadline and the strictness of the foreclosure, it is strongly advised to consult a lawyer as soon as the minutes are received, in order to assess the chances of success and to take the necessary action within the time limit.
Can the persistent ringing of bells worn by a flock of sheep justify the conviction of their owner? In a ruling on 21 May 2026, the Court of Cassation answered in the affirmative, providing a concrete illustration of a concept now enshrined in the Civil Code: abnormal neighbourly disturbance.
For almost two centuries, this responsibility rested on no specific text. It was a pure creation of case law, based on the principle that «no one should cause another person a disturbance exceeding the normal inconveniences of neighbourhood relations.» Law no. 2024-346 of 15 April 2024, aimed at adapting civil liability law to current challenges, put an end to this uniqueness by introducing a new article 1253 of the Civil Code, which has been in effect since 17 April 2024.
This text establishes a strict liability regime. Whoever causes a disturbance exceeding the normal inconveniences of neighbourhood—whether they are the owner, tenant, unauthorised occupant, or developer—is liable for the damage caused, without the need to demonstrate fault on their part. Only the abnormality of the disturbance matters, assessed solely by the lower court judges in light of the local context, its duration, and its intensity. It is precisely this reasoning that the third Civil Chamber confirmed in the case of the bells (appeal no. 24-10.569): observing that this continuous ringing was not characteristic of the rural environment concerned and that guard dogs were already sufficient to protect the flock, it approved the Court of Appeal's order for the removal of the bells and compensation for the neighbour.
However, Article 1253 introduces an essential safeguard: the so-called exception of anteriority, or the theory of prior occupation. Liability is not incurred when the nuisance arises from activities that pre-dated the victim's installation, provided that these activities complied with regulations and continued under conditions that did not intensify the nuisance. The legislator also intended to specifically protect the agricultural sector, by referring to Article L. 311-1-1 of the Rural and Maritime Fishing Code.
In practice, this new regime concerns as much the neighbour fed up with noise or odour nuisance as it does the farmer, the craftsman, or the property developer. For the purchaser of a property located near a farm, a construction site, or a noisy establishment, the prior existence of the activity becomes a determining factor: moving in with full knowledge of the situation may prohibit any recourse.
Before taking action – or resisting it – it is therefore wise to have the actual abnormality of the disturbance, the seniority of the activities in question, and the quality of the available evidence assessed. A prior legal analysis often makes it possible to avoid lengthy and costly litigation, or to secure its outcome.
The question of who has the right to add a storey to a co-owned building continues to occupy the courts. The third civil chamber of the Court of Cassation, in a decision published in the Bulletin (Cass. 3e civ., 2 April 2026, n° 24-15.059), provides a clear answer: this right belongs, unless otherwise stipulated, to the co-ownership syndicate, even when the building concerned comprises only a single private unit.
In this case, a civil real estate company, owner of the sole unit in a building that was part of a co-owned complex, had undertaken steps to proceed with works to add an extra storey. Believing that the building belonged to it entirely, it claimed the freedom to exercise this right alone. The co-owners' association, contesting this analysis, brought the case before the judge. The Paris Court of Appeal having granted the co-owners' association's request, the SCI lodged an appeal, arguing that ownership of the sole unit should entail ownership of the volume situated above.
The Court of Cassation dismisses the appeal. It recalls, under Article 35 of Law No. 65-557 of 10 July 1965, that the construction of additional storeys on a building comprising common areas, with a view to creating new private premises, may only be carried out by the co-owners' association, by a majority vote as stipulated in Article 26. However, even if the SCI owned the sole unit in the building, this unit included special common areas – notably the structural work, foundations, and roof. The building could therefore not be deemed to be a purely private part, and the airspace above it could not be considered independently of the collective regime. The decision to build additional storeys, and if applicable the sale of this right to a third party, therefore falls within the exclusive competence of the general meeting.
This ruling usefully reminds us that ownership of a unit, even if it's the only one, does not grant the right to exploit the airspace above the building. A co-owner wishing to build an extra storey must obtain express authorisation from the general meeting, under the conditions laid down by the law of 10 July 1965 and its implementing decree. Otherwise, work undertaken without authority is liable to demolition proceedings initiated by the syndicate, not to mention the risk of compensation and the practical impossibility of obtaining a building permit cleared of any appeals. The decision also invites the authors of co-ownership rules – particularly in complex property developments – to anticipate the issue, by means of an express clause reserving or assigning the right to build an extra storey.
Before any extension operation, it is therefore essential to carefully examine the co-ownership rules, to have the exact composition of the building diagnosed (general or special common areas, private areas), and to prepare in advance the resolution to be submitted to the assembly. Otherwise, the project, however well-developed technically and financially, will remain legally compromised. The firm is available to co-owners, syndicates, and investors wishing to secure the legal feasibility of an extension operation.
Personal injury: why the mission assigned to the medical expert determines the victim's compensation
When a victim of an accident claims compensation for their personal injury, the outcome of their compensation is often decided well before the hearing: at the stage, sometimes overlooked, of the mission entrusted to the medical expert.
A recent ruling by the Versailles Court of Appeal, delivered on January 29, 2026, reiterated this point with clarity. Seized with a dispute concerning an expert assessment known as «ANADOC» (short for the National Office for Documentation on Personal Injury), the court fully upheld the assessment ordered by the judge of interim measures. The parties challenging it argued that it would cause confusion, exceed the scope of the expert's remit, and pose a risk of double compensation for damages. The Court of Appeal dismissed all of these criticisms.
This solution is based on two well-established principles. Firstly, the judge in summary proceedings remains free to determine the mandate they wish to give to the expert: they are bound neither by the so-called Dintilhac nomenclature, which is only indicative, nor by the parties' proposals. Secondly, compensation for personal injury is governed by the principle of full reparation, which requires placing the victim, as far as possible, back in the situation they would have been in had the damage not occurred, covering all the loss, but only the loss.
It is in light of these principles that the stakes of permanent functional deficit, a central element in the compensation for permanent after-effects, are understood. This damage covers, after the date of consolidation, three distinct dimensions: the impairment of the victim's physiological functions, the ongoing pain they continue to suffer, and the loss of quality of life in their personal, familial, and social existence. By asking the expert to describe these components separately, a detailed mission does not create a risk of double counting; rather, it provides the judge with the precise elements they need to measure the true extent of the damage without distorting it.
Practical teaching is important. The drafting of an expert report is not a mere technical formality. A deficient report, which might, for example, be satisfied with an overall incapacity rate, deprives the judge of essential information and frequently leads to an underestimation of compensation. Conversely, a precise report clarifies each head of damage and safeguards the rights of the victim, as well as the insurer's interest in a rigorous and adversarial assessment.
For the victim, the conclusion is clear: it is crucial to be accompanied, from the expert appraisal stage and even before the application to the judge for interim relief, by a lawyer and a medical consultant capable of discussing the content of the mandate. It is at this early stage that fair and full compensation is often established.
CCMI: the forfeiture clause is not a penalty clause and is outside the judge's power to moderate.
By a judgment published on 8 January 2026 (Cass. 3E civ., 8 January 2026, no. 24-12.082), the Court of Cassation recalls a fundamental distinction in construction law: the lump-sum compensation due by the client who decides to withdraw from a contract for the construction of an individual house (CCMI) falls under the forfeiture clause, and not the penalty clause; as such, it cannot be reduced by the judge, even if its amount may seem high.
In this particular case, the individuals had signed a CCMI stipulating that, in the event of termination on their initiative, they would be required to pay the builder compensation amounting to 10% of the agreed price, a sum intended to cover costs already incurred and loss of earnings. Having abandoned their project, they sought a reduction in this compensation, which had been set at €13,781. The Paris Court of Appeal had reduced it to €6,980, viewing it as a manifestly excessive penalty clause. The Third Civil Chamber rejected this reasoning and reinstated the contractual compensation.
Legal analysis is based on the classic distinction between two contractual mechanisms that are often confused. The penalty clause, governed by Article 1231-5 of the Civil Code, penalises the culpable non-performance of an obligation and may, as such, be reduced or increased by the judge if its amount appears manifestly excessive or derisory. The withdrawal clause, on the other hand, is the monetary consideration for a right of withdrawal granted to one of the parties: this party does not breach their commitments; they are exercising a right. However, in the context of a CCMI, Article 1794 of the Civil Code expressly recognises the client's right to unilaterally terminate the fixed-price contract before its completion, requiring them to compensate the contractor for their expenses, their work, and anything they might have earned. The High Court draws the logical consequence: the lump-sum compensation negotiated by the parties to arrange this legal right is not intended to penalise a fault, but to organise in advance the liquidation of a right. It cannot therefore be classified as a penalty clause, nor, consequently, be reduced by the judge.
In practice, this solution reminds prospective homeowners that a CCMI is not a contract that can be rescinded without cost. Before signing, it is essential to carefully examine the financial conditions for unilateral termination and assess the actual exposure in the event of a change of plans, particularly when the builder has already undertaken studies, administrative steps or supplies. For builders, the decision secures contract drafting and confirms that the lump-sum compensation provided for in Article 1794 remains fully enforceable, provided it is clearly set out as the consideration for a right of withdrawal and not as a penalty for non-performance.
Clients who are considering abandoning a construction project would be well-advised to seek legal advice before issuing any notice. This will allow them to assess the exact nature of the stipulated clause, the possibility of an amicable settlement, and grounds for recourse, for example, resulting from a prior breach by the builder. The line between a withdrawal penalty and a penalty clause remains fine, and each case requires individual analysis.
References: Cass. 3E civ., 8 January 2026, No. 24-12.082, published in the Bulletin; Articles 1794 and 1231-5 of the Civil Code; Articles L. 231-1 et seq. of the Construction and Housing Code.
The litigation surrounding the right to evidence has a new illustration in labour law. In a judgment delivered on 1st April 2026, the social chamber of the Court of Cassation ruled that documents obtained by an employee through an intrusion into the company's IT system were admissible in employment tribunal proceedings.
The facts of the case reflect a familiar situation. Temporarily suspended following a statement made against his employer, an employee argued that his dismissal constituted a retaliatory measure. To prove this, during his suspension, he accessed a manager's work computer and extracted three files, which he then produced before the labour tribunal. The Court of Appeal having rejected these documents on the grounds of their illicit nature, the social chamber overturned this analysis in its ruling no. 24-19.193 of 1st April 2026.
The Court's reasoning follows the line laid down by the plenary assembly on 22 December 2023, which had accepted that a civil judge could, under certain conditions, admit evidence obtained or produced unlawfully or unfairly. The social chamber recalls here that, to be admissible, such evidence must meet two cumulative requirements. Firstly, it must be indispensable for the exercise of the right of proof of the party invoking it, in the absence of any other means of evidence. Secondly, it must only infringe the opposing interest — here, the right to respect for private life of the director — to a strictly proportionate extent to the objective pursued. In this specific case, the Court notes that the employee had no other way to demonstrate the retaliatory nature of the dismissal and that he limited himself to producing three files. The interference with private life was, according to the legal judges, contained within admissible limits.
This decision has significant practical implications. It confirms that the line traditionally drawn between fair and unfair evidence is no longer, in itself, a bar to claims in an employment tribunal. However, as the ruling was made by a limited panel, without publication in the Bulletin, it is not being established as a leading case: its scope remains confined to the specific circumstances and requires careful interpretation. Employers would be well advised to anticipate these situations with a clear policy on managing IT access and traceability, while employees must ensure, before taking any investigative action, that they measure the truly indispensable nature of the means employed and restrict themselves to what is strictly necessary.
Ultimately, the social chamber is continuing the reorganisation of evidence law initiated at the end of 2023, confirming that procedural fairness is now, in strictly regulated cases, giving way to the effectiveness of the right to a defence.
Heat strainers: how the ban on renting out G-rated homes will affect landlords
From 1 January 2025, it will be illegal to rent out homes with an energy performance rating of G (DPE) in mainland France, marking the start of a new phase in the fight against «heating flats». This change is part of the progressive timetable set out in the French Climate and Resilience Act 2021-1104 of 22 August 2021. Following on from the rent freeze applicable from 24 August 2022 to F- and G-rated homes located in high-tension areas, the legislature has gone a step further by including energy performance as a condition of decency. The same law announces the following stages: exclusion from the rental housing stock of homes rated F on 1 January 2028, then rated E on 1 January 2034. In legal terms, the mechanism is based on the amendment of article 6 of law no. 89-462 of 6 July 1989, which defines the decent accommodation that all landlords are obliged to provide. Henceforth, a property whose final energy consumption, as estimated by the DPE, exceeds the threshold corresponding to class G is deemed not to be decent. The tenant then has the prerogatives set out in article 20-1 of the same law: he or she can ask the landlord to bring the property into compliance, and, if no agreement is reached, refer the matter to the judge in charge of protection disputes. The judge has a wide range of powers, including the power to force work to be carried out, to reduce the rent and even to award damages. Articles L. 173-1-1 et seq. of the Code de la construction et de l'habitation consolidate these provisions. The practical application of these provisions calls for a number of distinctions. The ban applies to leases entered into, renewed or tacitly renewed on or after 1 January 2025; current leases signed prior to this date are not automatically terminated, but the tenant retains the right to bring an action for decency at any time. In condominiums, where the work required involves the common areas - insulation of facades, roof repairs, replacement of a central heating system - the landlord cannot act alone. Recent case law accepts that, in such cases, the lessor who has duly referred the matter to the managing agent and submitted a resolution to the general meeting cannot be held in default until the co-ownership has approved the work, provided that he can demonstrate that he has taken diligent action. Before any property is re-let, it is essential to have an up-to-date DPE (environmental impact assessment), which may be supplemented by an energy audit. If the property is co-owned, the best way to plan ahead is to prepare the resolutions submitted to the general meeting and, where possible, to mobilise the multi-annual works plan. Consulting a lawyer will help to secure the lease, decide between renovation and leaving the rental property, and prevent disputes between tenants and co-owners.
Long confined to a praetorian principle forged by the Court of Cassation, the theory of abnormal neighbourhood disturbances now has a clear statutory basis: Article 1253 of the Civil Code, introduced by Law No. 2024-346 of 15 April 2024. This apparently technical development has very concrete consequences for property owners, tenants, co-ownership associations and building professionals.
Let us recall the context. Following a landmark ruling on 19 November 1986 (Cass. 2e civ.), the Court of Cassation recognised that a neighbour could incur liability, without fault needing to be demonstrated, provided that they caused another person a nuisance exceeding the normal inconveniences of neighbourhood. Noise, smells, dust, loss of sunlight, intrusive views: the scope of application was wide, but the system was based entirely on case law. The legislature of 2024 wished to secure this construct, without distorting it, by inscribing it in Article 1253 of the Civil Code.
The new article enshrines the principle that any owner, tenant, unauthorised occupier, beneficiary of a title whose main purpose is to authorise him to occupy or use land, project manager or person exercising the powers of such a person who causes a disturbance that exceeds normal neighbourhood annoyances is automatically liable for the resulting damage. Liability thus remains objective: the victim does not have to establish fault, but only the abnormal nature of the disturbance, the harm suffered and the causal link. However, article 1253 adds an important clarification, already recognised by case law: liability is not triggered where the disturbance results from activities, whatever their nature, that pre-existed the installation of the injured party, provided that they comply with the laws and regulations and continue under the same conditions or under new conditions that do not cause an aggravation of the disturbance. This clause, known as the «pre-occupation» clause, protects farmers, craftsmen and industrialists who set up business before the complainant arrived.
In practice, codification clarifies the circle of potential debtors. A project owner can thus be held directly liable for nuisances caused by a construction site, without the need to rely solely on the contractual liability of the contractor. In co-ownership, the syndicate may have its liability engaged for common areas in its care. For the tenant, the rule confirms that they are personally responsible for disturbances they cause, independently of the landlord's potential liability. The victim retains the choice to take action against one or the other, or even against several joint and several co-perpetrators.
Several reflexes are worth adopting. Before taking action, it is essential to document the disturbance precisely – bailiff's reports, acoustic measurements, dated photographs, statements – because abnormality is judged solely by the trial judges in light of the environment, duration, and intensity of the nuisance. For the alleged perpetrator, the pre-occupation clause does not exempt them from respecting current regulations, particularly regarding town planning, classified installations, or noise pollution. Prior mediation, which is mandatory for many neighbourly disputes, also remains an often decisive step.
Ultimately, Article 1253 of the Civil Code does not invent a new right but consolidates a protective and balanced regime. Faced with a persistent disturbance, it is strongly recommended to seek legal advice without delay in order to assess the most appropriate strategy: formal notice, action for cessation, claim for damages, or even interim protective measures.
Legal references: Law no. 2024-346 of 15 April 2024 to adapt civil liability law to current challenges; Article 1253 of the Civil Code; Cass. 2nd Civil Chamber, 19 November 1986, no. 84-16.379; Cass. 3rd Civil Chamber, 17 April 1996.
Co-ownership and tourist rentals: the Constitutional Council validates the ban by a two-thirds majority
Co-ownerships now have enhanced leverage to regulate short-term rentals such as Airbnb in their buildings: by decision n° 2025-1186 QPC of 19 March 2026, the Constitutional Council ruled the provisions of the law of 19 November 2024, which allow for the prohibition of these rentals by a qualified majority, rather than by unanimity, to be compliant with the Constitution.
The priority question of constitutionality was transmitted by the Court of Cassation on 18 December 2025 (appeal number 25-40.030), at the initiative of the SCI de la Barge rousse, which challenged a general meeting resolution prohibiting furnished tourist rentals in its co-ownership. The applicant argued that Article 26 of the law of 10 July 1965, as amended by Article 6 of Law No. 2024-1039 of 19 November 2024, known as the «Le Meur Law», disproportionately infringed on the right to property by lowering the required majority threshold for such a prohibition.
The Constitutional Council dismissed this complaint. It considered that the legislator was pursuing two legitimate general interest objectives: firstly, the fight against the nuisances generated by the turnover of short-term tenants in residential buildings, and secondly, the fight against the shortage of housing available for long-term rental, which is particularly acute in tight housing market tourist areas. The Council also noted that the system was sufficiently regulated to guarantee the proportionality of the infringement on the right to property.
Indeed, the scope of the measure is strictly defined. It only applies to co-ownerships whose regulations already include a "bourgeois habitation" clause, meaning a clause prohibiting any commercial activity in residential units. Furthermore, the prohibition can only target second homes: owners who occasionally rent out their main residence are not affected. The prohibition applies equally to all co-owners, with no possibility of discrimination. Finally, the decision is reversible: the same two-thirds majority is sufficient to subsequently lift the prohibition.
Practically speaking, this decision marks a turning point for co-ownership syndicates facing an increase in holiday rentals in their buildings. Whereas the requirement for unanimity made any ban almost impossible to obtain, a two-thirds majority of the votes of co-owners present, represented or having voted by post, now makes this approach achievable. Co-ownership properties located in large cities and tourist areas are the most affected. Conversely, investors who acquired properties with the intention of operating them as furnished tourist accommodation must recognise this new risk and anticipate a possible amendment to their building's co-ownership regulations.
However, it should be remembered that any resolution adopted on this basis remains subject to judicial review, which may verify that the prohibition is indeed justified by the destination of the property as resulting from the co-ownership rules. Co-owners wishing to undertake this approach therefore have every interest in obtaining assistance to legally secure the resolution submitted to a vote at the general meeting.
References: Constitutional Council, decision no. 2025-1186 QPC of 19 March 2026; law no. 2024-1039 of 19 November 2024; Article 26 of law no. 65-557 of 10 July 1965; Cass. 3E civ., 18 December 2025, No. 25-40.030; Tourism Code, Article L. 324-1-1.
From the start of 2026, no co-ownership will escape the obligation to draw up a multi-year works plan. This deadline, long anticipated by property professionals, now applies to all co-ownership buildings over fifteen years old, regardless of their size.
The multi-year works plan, introduced by Law No. 2021-1104 of 22 August 2021 on combating climate change and strengthening resilience to its effects, known as the Climate and Resilience Law, has been implemented progressively. After initially applying to co-ownerships with more than two hundred units from 2023, then those with fifty to two hundred units in 2024, it has been mandatory for all co-ownerships where the building was constructed more than fifteen years ago since 1 January 2026, in accordance with Article 14-2 of the Law of 10 July 1965 establishing the co-ownership regime for built properties.
In concrete terms, the PPT is a strategic document drawn up over a ten-year period. It is based on a technical analysis of the building and lists all the work necessary for the conservation of the property, the preservation of the health and safety of the occupants, as well as the improvement of its energy performance. The document must include a financial estimate of the identified works, a schedule for their completion, and a prioritisation according to their degree of urgency. It is based, in particular, on the collective energy performance diagnosis, which has also become mandatory for all co-ownerships since 1 January 2026.
The joint owner's agent plays a central role in implementing this obligation. It is their responsibility to include the development or updating of the PPT on the agenda for the general meeting, to submit the draft for the joint owners to vote on, and to ensure that the decisions adopted are carried out. Failure to comply with these obligations may lead to the agent's professional liability being called into question.
For co-owners, the impact is just as significant. The PPT now makes the creation of the mandatory works fund conditional, with the annual amount not being less than 2.5 % of the estimated amount of works planned in the plan. Furthermore, when any co-owned lot is sold, the PPT must be communicated to the buyer, along with the other mandatory documents provided for by law. Its absence could constitute a breach of the pre-contractual information obligation.
In practice, co-ownerships that have not yet undertaken this process are in an irregular situation. It is strongly recommended that co-ownership associations mandate a qualified professional, such as a certified surveyor or architect, without delay to produce this document. The cost of this operation, which varies depending on the size and complexity of the building, represents an essential investment for both legal compliance and the preservation of the property's asset value.
This reform is part of a broader movement to hold co-ownerships accountable for the challenges of energy renovation, in a context where the progressive ban on renting out the most energy-intensive properties, rated G from 2025 and F from 2028, reinforces the urgency of rigorous planning for works.